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Most previous empirical approaches examined the relationship between social spending 
and economic growth only in developed countries or OECD member countries, and 
show little or no efforts to compare the effects of social spending in developing 
countries with those in developed or OECD member countries; however, developing 
countries can be in very different social, economic, and institutional settings.  
 
Therefore, we examined this relationship, drawing a comparison between the result of 
developing countries and that of developed (or OECD member) and semi-developed 
countries with the same data source, the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics data of 85 
countries over the period from 1990 to 2007, using time-series cross-section regression 
model.  
 
We found that estimated coefficient on social spending is positive and statistically 
significant in the sample of developing countries, while a significant negative 
relationship between social spending and economic growth is observed in the sample of 
developed countries. The results of this study can suggest that assumption of a tradeoff 
between efficiency and equity could be not well applied in the developing countries. 
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Therefore, this finding can imply that we have to consider not only what to do but also 
where to do, when we discuss the social spending effect and give policy advises to 
developing countries. 
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Although developmental welfare is not a new issue, social policy is now, partly 
because of effort by neo-liberal economists, being vigorously discussed again in the 
context of development (Midgley and Tang, 2001; Kwon, 2005; Mkandawire, 2001; 
Hall and Midgley, 2004).  
Neo-liberal economic theories argue that social expenditure does harm to the 
economy and that spending on social policy should be reduced for the country’s 
competitiveness. In practice, however, the programs based on this neo-liberal view seem 
to have made the situation much worse in many developing countries during 1980s and 
1990s; World Bank’s and International Monetary Foundation’s stabilization programs 
such as austerity, privatization, and reduction of government social spending have 
resulted in economic and social vulnerability (Cornia et al, 1987). Conditions of these 
countries were worsened directly by rapidly rising food prices and elimination of basic 
nutritional, educational, and health services, and indirectly by slowing growth and 
increasing poverty (Cornia et al, 1987).  
Lindert (2004, 2006) insisted that social spending does not negatively affect the 
growth, showing some statistical and historical records, and criticized neo-liberal 
economic theories as “theory-dependent bluffs.” Further, Kwon (2007) pointed out that 
the developmental state in Korea, which considerably contributed to rapid economic 
growth, conducted not only economic policy but also social policy as an overall 
economic development strategy. Hort and Kuhnle (2000) argued that East Asian 
countries adopted social welfare programs as policy instruments for economic growth, 
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and Goodman and White (1998) suggested that these East Asian welfare states’ social 
policy aimed at goals such as subordinating welfare to economic efficiency and 
discouraging dependence on the state. 
In spite of many discussions and controversies about the impact of social spending 
on economic growth, there has been relatively little attention to the empirical support for 
the hypotheses mentioned above. Lindert (2006: 237) pointed out this lack of empirical 
approach saying that “theory has gone into overdrive” in the issue of developmental 
welfare with the widening gap between empirical record and a story, although theory 
and fact are needed to be mixed in the right proportion. Even if there are growth studies 
that tested effect of social spending, the data they used were, in most researches, that of 
OECD members and not of developing countries. This means that there is a need to test 
this relationship with samples covering developing countries. Further, previous studies 
shows little or no efforts to compare the effects of social spending in developing 
countries with those in developed or OECD member countries, although developing 
countries can be in very different social, economic, and institutional settings. Therefore, 
the objective of this study is to test the relationship between social spending and 
economic growth with cross country panel data, and draw comparison between the 
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II. WELFARE STATE MODELS AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Wilensky and Lebeaux (1958) preliminarily suggested the types of welfare states 
with “residual” and “institutional” approaches to social welfare, reflecting different 
thoughts in social policy and the role of the welfare state; their typology and its terms 
have been widely used and often mentioned in social policy literature (Sainsbury, 2007; 
Mishra, 1981; Bryson 1992; Graycar and Jamrozik, 1993, Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 
1987). The residual approach of social welfare views that state assistance fills the gap 
where the primary institutions, which are the “market” and the “family,” can not meet 
the needs of a person or a family; that is, welfare states play a role when these 
institutions have proved inadequate. Therefore, social welfare, according to this view, 
should be kept minimal, temporary, requiring evidence of needs, and is only for the 
disadvantaged. On the other hand, the institutional approach of welfare sees that welfare 
is a dominant institution, so welfare states meet the needs of everyone and not just of the 
disadvantaged. In other words, it views that the role of the state is to provide 
comprehensive and universal social policy. In turn, the institutional view leads to higher 
social spending, and universal programs for the benefit of all. By contrast, the residual 
view leads to lower social spending, selective means-tested programs, and provision to 
only those who are most in need. 
Titmuss (1974) challenged the typology of Wilensky and Lebeaux, and elaborated it, 
claiming that the residual and the institutional models appear simultaneously with the 
third model that he named the “industrial achievement-performance model” of social 
welfare; he also added “redistributive” to the definition of the institutional model. The 
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“industrial achievement-performance model” emphasizes social policies that are closely 
related to performance in market economy, such as promoting higher productivity, 
greater motivation, more work, and so on. Titmuss's own favorite is the “industrial 
achievement-performance model” where the welfare policies become major integrative 
tools for the society as a whole, providing universalistic responses to non-stigmatizing 
needs in the direction of resource redistribution (Demerath, 1977). 
Furniss and Tilton (1977) provided a typology of welfare state, based on the three 
distinctive responses to the rise of advanced industrialization. First, they describe the 
United States as a “positive state.” The fundamental goal of the positive state is to 
protect property holders from the problems of unregulated market in capitalist society, 
and from the influence of redistributive demands. Therefore, this type of state shows 
strong opposition to social policies that are not directed by concerns of efficiency. They 
suggested that the “positive states” depend on social insurance that is based on actuarial 
principles. The second response to the rise of advanced industrialization is “social 
security state” that United Kindom represents. This type of state is based on two 
principles, which are the ‘maximalist full employment’ and the ‘guaranteed national 
minimum.’ This means that the principle is clearly not ‘equality’ but ‘equality of 
opportunity.’ The third response is the “social welfare state,” which Furniss and Tilton 
sees Sweden as a representative example. The goals of this state are full employment 
achieved by government-union cooperation, environmental planning, and solidaristic 
wage settlements.  
George and Wilding (1976) analyzed the ideological conflicts of the welfare state, 
and suggested four types of thoughts; those are labeled as “anti-collectivism,” “reluctant 
collectivism,” “Fabian socialism,”, and “Marxism.” These ideology types are based on 
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the analysis of representative thinkers (George, 1985); Milton Friedman, Hayek, and 
Enoch Powell are the anti-collectivists; Crosland, Tawney, and Titmuss are the Fabian 
socialists; and Strachey, Laski and Miliband are the Marxists. Their classification seems 
to be a variation of attitudes towards the market economy, and this approach implies that 
the values of capitalism and the ethic of welfare are, according to them, in conflict 
(George, 1985; 34). “Anti-collectivists” advocate liberty and individualism, and think 
that the pursuit of equality is incompatible with these values. They insist that market 
mechanism is the most efficient means of resource allocation. “Reluctant collectivists” 
have similar perception to the anti-collectivists, but have less faith in market economy. 
They think that the unregulated capitalist economy can be inefficient in some way, and 
does not necessarily produce a just distribution of resources. Therefore, state 
intervention is justified, but it should be the minimum required to remove the 
inefficiency and injustices generated by unregulated markets. Poverty, not inequality, is 
the concern of the welfare state, and the provision of a minimum of income security and 
essential services is their approach. “Fabian socialists” have a belief in equality, and also 
have more positive attitude to state action than reluctant collectivists do. The 
government plays an essential role not only in regulating but also in controlling, 
directing and planning the economy, to maximize growth, justice and welfare. 
“Marxists” regard the welfare state as inherently limited because it is rooted in a 
capitalist class society. They think that socialist planned economy must replace the 
capitalist market economy to achieve the goals of liberty, welfare and justice for all.  
Esping-Andersen (1990) suggested three different types of welfare states, which 
remains one of the most commonly used typologies of modern welfare states. He 
identifies the process of decommodification of the wage earner in relation to theoretical 
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classification of advanced capitalist states. His welfare states types have a resemblance 
to those by Titmuss; however, the difference is that Esping-Andersen identifies the 
social, political, economic, and historical context that these types of welfare states 
established in the countries, while Titmuss and others focus on the characteristics of 
each welfare type. Esping-Andersen insisted that categorization of welfare states cannot 
be based on the level of social spending, since not “all spending counts equally” and 
“social spending per se was hardly ever at the centre of major political conflict” 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). He partly rejected the ‘working-class mobilization theory,’ 
saying that working-class mobilization is not a ‘single powerful causal force,’ but rather 
in interaction with other factors such as the nature of class mobilization like union 
structure, the opportunities of forming class-political coalition, and the historical legacy 
of regime institutionalization. He also rejects the idea of an evolutionary development of 
social reform starting with a liberal era, being displaced by a phase of social insurance 
establishment, and approaching an era of comprehensive protection. Esping-Andersen’s 
view is well represented by his expression that ‘politics not only matters, but is 
decisive’; That is, the types of social policy were formed by the power constellations 
during the stage of welfare states formation, and came from the different ideologies of 
those political actors as they entered certain coalitions and compromised on certain 
outcomes. Therefore, ‘three highly diverse regime-types’ were suggested, which were 
organized around its own logic of organization, stratification, and societal integration. 
Different historical forces were based on the origins of these types of welfare states, and 
“qualitatively different developmental trajectories” were shown in them (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; 3).  
Three regime-types categorized by Esping-Andersen are “liberal welfare state,” 
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“conservative and corporatist welfare state,” and “social democratic welfare state”; in 
fact, Titmuss’s “residual,” “industrial achievement-performance,” and “'institutional 
redistributive' welfare state are corresponding to Esping-Andersen’s ones. He suggests 
that his typology categorizes social policies of the OECD countries according to 
decommodification, stratification, and the private-public combination in pensions. 
welfare markets. Decommodification is a key concept of Esping-Andersen's typology 
that categorizes regime types, which denotes “the degree to which individuals, or 
families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market 
participation” or “the ease with which an average person can opt out of the market” 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 37-49). The archetype of the liberal welfare state is the United 
States, which has a low level of decommodification, profound dependence on minimal 
means-tested benefits, and an extensive role of markets in the production of welfare. The 
representative example of conservative and corporatist welfare state is the German 
welfare state where a strong corporatist-statist legacy exists, characterized by 
maintenance of the status quo, not redistributive, and distinct social insurance system 
focused on preserving the traditional family. The prototype of social democratic welfare 
state is Sweden, dominated by a high level of decommodification, citizenship-based 
universal benefits, equal rights to have benefits and services, and a minor role of 
markets in social policy.  
Jones (1993) suggested that East Asian states such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore would not qualify by Titmuss’s standard of welfare states or that of 
Esping-Andersen, and rather have their own model. For example, she says that none of 
them are committed to Titmuss’ institutional-redistributive model as the ultimate 
objective, but it became barely possible to exclude any of them from this type, once a 
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more multicolored set of criteria in respect of a range of different types of welfare state 
is allowed (Jones, 1993: 199). Further, she suggested that welfare capitalist typology by 
Esping-Andersen is very much a “Western” one, and it only serves to establish “what the 
tigers are not” (Jones, 1993). According to her, key of their welfare state model is the 
Confucianism which has hierarch, duty, compliance, consensus, order, harmony, stability, 
and staying in power. Kwon (1998) suggested four characteristics of the East Asian 
welfare states on the basis of empirical and comparative research on the five countries 
that Jones mentioned; first, the spending for social welfare is financed largely by 
regulator, and quasi-governmental bodies, which is normally not state agencies, manage 
the fund, except for Hong Kong; second, this financing made a fragmented welfare 
system; third, the welfare system has a less redistributive characteristics than Western 
welfare states, especially Singapore does; fourth, labor union and social democratic 
parties have very limited influence on welfare policy compared to Western states. 
Goodman and White (1998) suggested some strength of East Asian welfare model, 
stemming from the characteristics listed above. This model subordinates welfare to 
economic efficiency and growth, discouraging dependence on the state, promoting 
private sources of welfare, and diverting the financial resources of social insurance to 
investment in infrastructure. On the other hand, the East Asian welfare model has its 
inevitable shortcoming due to its selective characteristics of the system, since social 
policy programs covered mainly industrial workers, reinforcing socioeconomic 
inequalities (Goodman and White, 1998; Kwon, 2007). 
Rudra (2007) attempts to highlight systematic differences among the political 
economies of the developing world, particularly with respect to their distribution 
regimes, utilizing Esping-Andersen’s decomodification concept. He suggested that that 
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welfare efforts in least developed countries (LDCs) are either directed towards 
“promoting market development” (a productive welfare state), “protecting select 
individuals from the market” (a protective welfare state), or both (a dual welfare state). 
 
Figure 1 Welfare States in Developed and Developing Countries 
 
Notes: The figure is adopted from Rudra (2007: 383) 
 
Protective welfare states intentionally avoid international markets and ultimately 
focus government efforts on decommodification. Politicians are allowed to exercise 
great discretion and control over the economy by focusing on protecting domestic firms 
from international competition politicians. Leader could provide allowances to both 
workers and firms in the major industrializing sectors, thanks to nonexistence the threat 
of international market competition and pressures of cost containment. As a result, 
fusion of elements of socialism and conservatism Protective welfare states is made. 
protective welfare states strongly distrust markets like the OECD social democratic 
model. However, protective welfare states in developing countries are distinguished 
- 14 - 
 
from both the social democratic and conservative welfare models in that highlighting on 
decommodification occurred prior to proletarianization and, accordingly, social rights 
have been directed towards a small clientele (Rudra, 2007). 
In contrast, productive welfare states emphasize commodification, and originally 
developed from systems which actively promoted participation in export markets. 
Emphasis on cost containment is created by the goal of encouraging international 
competitiveness of domestic firms, and governments are required to surrender some 
control over the economy. The range of social welfare is much more restricted, as 
leaders are constrained from pursuing worker benefits. Thereby, the liberal model by 
Esping-Andersen shares certain components with Productive welfare states. In contrast 
to its counterpart, this regime type holds close some of the nineteenth-century liberal 
enthusiasm for the market and self-reliance (Rudra, 2007). The emphasis upon 
strengthening the commodity status of labor in a globalizing economy is the 
characteristics of productive welfare state that the liberal paradigm ultimately comes to 
distinguish. Substantial level of public intervention aims to enhance international market 
participation in productive welfare states. Social policies are constrained by this goal 
and have to be implemented without hampering business activity. In contrast, the 
proletarianization occurred gradually in the OECD countries over two centuries, and 
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III. EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON SOCIAL SPENDING 
 
The studies on the research that question the relationship between social spending 
and growth have resulted in mixed findings both theoretically and empirically.  
Advocates of positive effect of social spending base their argument on that social 
spending can (1) help build higher quality of human capital (2) reduce social conflict, 
increasing the level of social cohesion of the country (3) allow laborers to adapt to 
radically changing industrial structure and technology (4) and stabilize economy, 
reducing inflation in boom days and creating effectual demand in economic depression 
(Rodrick, 1999; Blank, 1994; Kohl, 1981; Abramovitz, 1981; Haveman, 1988). 
Empirically, several studies found the positive relationship between social spending 
and growth. Cashin (1994) showed that social security spending has a significant 
positive impact on GDP per capita growth in the 23 developed countries using annual 
data from 1971 to 1988 with OLS and IV method. Castles and Dowrick (1990) tested 
the relationship between 18 OECD countries’ social spending (health and education 
were excluded) and per capita GDP, and found a positive effect. They used pooled time-
series cross-section OLS method using data from 1971 to 1883. Korpi (1985) showed 
that ILO social expenditure to GDP is positively associated with the real per capita GDP 
in the 17 OECD countries during the period from 1950 to 1973. He used time series and 
cross-section estimation by unweighted OLS measuring total effects and controlling for 
the share of agricultural labor force. McCallum and Blais (1987) discovered a positive 
relationship between OECD social security transfers to GDP and Real GDP of the 
countries, using IV technique with controls for employment growth. They used 17 
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OECD countries with the period from 1960 to 1983. Castronova (2001) suggested that 
social spending does not seem to lower per capita incomes, using panel data of 13 
OECD countries from 1961 to 1991. Using simultaneous equation model with OECD 
data, De Grauwe and Polan (2005) suggested that countries with high level of social 
spending have high IMD and WEF competitiveness scores, and countries with well 
developed social security systems do not necessarily face a trade-off between social 
spending and competitiveness,. Baldacci et al (2004) found, using social spending panel 
data in 120 developing countries from 1975 to 2000, that social spending on education 
and health in developing countries is positively associated with the accumulation of 
education and health capital, and education and health capital has positive impact on 
higher economic growth; they insisted that spending on education and health has 
positive “indirect impact on growth.” 
On the other hand, some studies insist that social spending does harm economic 
growth. They argue that social spending can (1) weaken the work incentive of recipients 
or tax payers (2) reduce private savings that could be otherwise used in investment for 
growth (3) increase dependence on government (4) expand shadow economy, making 
distortion in resource allocation (Gilder, 1981; Murray, 1984; Feldstein, 1982; 1996; 
Weede, 1986; Persson and Tabellini, 1994).  
Some studies showed negative effect or statistically non-significant effect of social 
spending on growth. Weede (1986, 1991) found that negative effect of social security 
transfers over GDP on the OECD countries’ real GDP. He used pooled time series and 
cross-section method with the period from 1960 to mid 1980s. Persson and Tabellini 
(1994) included the social expenditure over GDP as one of the independent variables in 
his growth model, and conducted a statistical test using the 13 OECD countries data 
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from 1960 to 1985. They used unweighted IV estimation method, and found negative 
but non-significant coefficients in the relationship between social spending and growth. 
Hansson and Henrekson (1994) found negative and significant effect of social security 
transfers over GDP in 14 OECD countries in the sub-period from 1965 to 1982, and real 
private output in 14 industries was the dependent variable. They used cross-country and 
cross-industry OLS, controlling for investment and employment. Arjona et al (2003) 
found that increased social protection expenditure is bad for economic growth, using 
PMG and GMM-IV approaches with an annual sample of 21 OECD countries running 
over the period 1970 to 1998. Landau (1985) suggested that transfer payment does not 
exhibit statistically significant correlation with growth, using pooled time-series cross-
section method with 16 OECD countries’ data from 1952 to 1976. Carritte and 
Willianison (1995) examined the effect of pension spending on economic growth based 
on pooled time-series cross-section social indicator models for 18 developed countries 
for the period between 1960 and 1988, and they found that the level of pension spending 
does not have a substantial impact on economic growth for the period between 1960 and 
1973, while a negative impact of pension spending was observed in the period between 
1974 and 1988. 
In the previous empirical approaches listed above, we can notice that there are some 
rooms that are needed to be further examined. First of all, most previous studies tested 
the relationship only in developed countries or OECD member countries, and there is 
little attention to the effects in developing countries. In fact, the social spending effect 
on economic development is somewhat more needed to be tested in developing 
countries, because the social development and economic growth is a critically urgent 
goal in those countries. Although there is a study by Baldacci et al (2004) that tries to 
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examine the relationship in developing country, it did not test the direct relationship 
between social spending and economic growth. They examined the impact of social 
spending on accumulation of education and health capital, and then linked this 
accumulated human capital to increased per capita GDP. Although this finding has some 
meaningful implications, we can very easily predict that more spending on education 
and health will bring about more educational and health capital accumulated, and that 
more educational and health capital accumulated will help economic development of the 
country, which are tested in their study; that is, these two relationships are very likely to 
be proved as positively related. However, what we are actually curious about is the 
effect of social spending on overall economic performance of the country; public 
spending affects not only the targeting objectives such as human capital accumulation 
but also unexpected areas, resulting in some problems sometimes. Therefore, it is 
meaningful to test direct relationship between social spending and economic growth in 
developing countries. In addition to this, Baldacci et al (2004) did not include the 
spending on social protection, but spending on social protection is very important issue 
in social policy and economic growth.  
Second, previous studies shows little or no efforts to compare the effects of social 
spending in developing countries with those in developed or OECD member countries. 
However, developing countries can be in very different social, economic, and 
institutional settings, which means social spending that have positive or negative or no 
impact in OECD countries can have different effects in developing countries. Therefore, 
it is worthy to draw a comparison between the result of developing countries and that of 
developed and semi-developed countries with the same data source, the IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics.  
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Third, there is a lack of empirical literatures using recent data; many studies used 
data published before 1990. Therefore, it is necessary to look into recent phenomena. 
This paper will use International Monetary Foundation’s Government Finance Statistics 
which collected data from 1990 to 2007. Considering that many of previous studies used 
OECD data, testing the relationship with other source can be also necessary for 
robustness.  
On the other hand, there could be a fundamental issue in spending approach that 
social spending to GDP itself is problematic in measuring the welfare efforts by the 
government (Esping-Andersen,1990). Therefore, it can be needed to observe specific 
styles of social policy conducted in different countries such as active labor market policy. 
However, there is lack of collected data, especially in developing countries, that this 
specific policy differences are reflected. Further, even spending approach studies have 
hardly dealt with developing countries. Therefore, this approach, which regards social 
spending to GDP as proxy, is still meaningful in testing the effect in developing 
countries and comparing the results, although we acknowledge that this approach can 













1. Analytic Framework 
 
This study tries to test the relationship between social spending and economic 
growth with the endogenous growth model. By doing this, we will examine the 
hypothesis that social spending can be instrumental in development. Following 









In the model, i is the country, t is the year and there are p explanatory, in which the  
To test the relationship between social spending and economic growth, we used 
time-series cross-sectional regression with error-components models. The time-series 
cross-sectional regression deals with panel data sets that consist of time-series on each 
of cross-section observation. Panel data creates variability, and provides more 
informative results by eliminating the need for lengthy time series because we can use 
the information available on the dynamic reactions of each subject (Kennedy 2003). 
Further, time-series cross-section data can provide “more informative data, more 
variability, less collinearity among variable, more degree of freedom and more 
efficiency” by combining time-series observations on cross-sectional units (Gujarati, 
2003: 637). Compared with either purely cross-sectional or purely time-series data, 
time-series cross-sectional data has the ability to study dynamics of changes and to 
model the differences, or heterogeneity, among subjects (Frees, 2004).  
However, we have to consider several things that can make OLS biased in time-
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series cross-section model (Oatley, 1999). For example, the time series component of 
such data sets poses autocorrelation problem, and error terms may exhibit 
heteroskedasticity both longitudinally and cross sectionally. Autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity produce bias in standard error estimates, so lead to incorrect statistical 
inferences. To deal with these problems, fixed effect model and random effect model can 
be used (Gujarati, 2003); result of Hausman test will be considered in selection of these 
models which can solve autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems.  
Fixed effect model assumes that independent variable and error term is correlated, 
while random effect model assumes that error term is independently and identically 
distributed. Random effect model does not need to use dummy variable in the model, so 
provides greater degree of freedom. However, there could be bias in estimation if 
correlation between fixed effect and independent variable exists. Therefore, appropriate 
model has to be decided based on Hausman test. If the null hypothesis that there is no 
correlation between independent variable and error term is rejected through Hausman 
test, fixed effect model is more appropriate. Random effect model can be used when the 
null hypothesis is not rejected, which means that there is no such correlation. 
The core difference between fixed and random effect models lies in the role of 
dummies. If dummies are considered as a part of the intercept, this is a fixed effect 
model. In a random effect model, the dummies act as an error term.  
The fixed effect model examines group differences in intercepts, assuming the same 
slopes and constant variance across groups. Fixed effect models use least squares 
dummy variable (LSDV), within effect, and between effect estimation methods. Thus, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with dummies, in fact, are fixed effect models.  
The random effect model, by contrast, estimates variance components for groups and 
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error, assuming the same intercept and slopes. The difference among groups (or time 
periods) lies in the variance of the error term. This model is estimated by generalized 
least squares (GLS) when the Ω matrix, a variance structure among groups, is known. 
The feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method is used to estimate the variance 
structure when Ω is not known. There are various estimation methods for FGLS 
including maximum likelihood methods and simulations (Baltagi and Chang, 1994). 
Fixed effects are tested by the incremental F test, while random effects are examined 
by the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). If the null hypothesis 
is not rejected, the pooled OLS regression is favored. The Hausman specification test 
(Hausman, 1978) compares fixed effect and random effect models. Table 1 compares the 
fixed effect and random effect models.  
 
There are some missing observations in the data, thus we used method of Wansbeek 
Table 1 Differences between Fixed Effect and Random Effect Models 
 Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Functional Form itkitiit vXay +++= βµ )(  )( itikitit vXay +++= µβ  
Intercepts 
Varying across groups and/or 
times 
Constant 
Error Variances Constant 
Varying across groups and/or 
times 
Slopes Constant Constant 
Estimation 
LSDV, within effect, between 
effect 
GLS, FGLS 
Hypothesis Test Incremental F test Breusch-Pagan LM test 
Notes: 
itv is independent and identically distributed with zero means. 
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and Kapteyn (1989), which has been being widely used in estimation of the error-
components model with unbalanced data. 
There are controversies on a reverse direction of causal relation between social 
spending and country’s competitiveness. For example, we can imagine that countries 
with a high level of economic growth can create extra income which, in turn, leads to a 
higher demand for social spending, resulting in more generous social services. However, 
De Grauwe and Polan (2005) investigated this reverse causality from competitiveness to 
social spending, and found that this relationship is weak. In fact, more researches have 
to be done to test the causality if someone wants to be able to say that country’s 
competitiveness or level of economic growth can significantly affect social spending. 
Therefore, we do not consider the reverse causality in the model, although we know and 
acknowledge the potential risk of different causal relation. 
 
 
2. Variables and Dataset 
 
The independent variable, social spending, will be measured by the average rate of 
central government’s expenditure on social protection, health, and education to GDP. 
The reason that we used the average of these three items as one variable instead of 
testing the effect of social protection, health, and education spending independently is 
that spending on these items can be overlapped considerably and can also be correlated, 
which can lead bias in the model itself or in the interpretation of the results. The 
dependent variable, economic growth, will be measured by the annual GDP growth rate 
of the countries. Social spending data, the average rate of the central government’s 
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expenditure on social protection, health, and education to GDP, is from the International 
Monetary Foundation’s Government Finance Statistics.  
Each country’s annual GDP growth rate is chosen as a dependent variable and the 
GDP growth rate data that this study will use is from the World Development Indicator 
by the World Bank. 
Control variables include population growth rate, inflation rate, and tax rate. These 
control variables were identified in the previous growth studies such as Easterly and 
Rebel (1993), Davoodi and Zou (1998), and Andres and Hernando (1997). The 
population growth rate, inflation rate, and Tax rate that this study uses are from the 
World Development Indicator. 
The data of this study includes 85 countries with annual observations from 1990 to 
2007 which is sufficient for the time-series cross-sectional regression. In order to 
analyze the differences stemming from social, economic, and institutional situations of 
the countries, the 85 countries are categorized into three groups; developing countries, 
semi-developed countries and developed countries. The GFS social spending data ware 
collected on two accounting bases, cash basis and accrual basis, and some countries data 
were reported on both basis. If we aggregate data without considering these two 
different accounting bases, it can create some bias in cross-sectional dimension, 
therefore, we separated country groups by each basis. However, due to the reduced 
sample size, caused by this separation, there is a possibility of wrong explanation of 
estimated results of regression in the groups with small sample size. To avoid this 
problem, we did a regression not only with the data of each basis but also with the 
aggregated data by combining cash basis data and accrual basis data, while 
acknowledging possible bias.  
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Cash Basis Bangladesh, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan 




Cash Basis Albania, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Cameroon, Egypt, Georgia, 
India,  Indonesia, Iran, Lesotho, Maldives, Moldova, 
Nicaragua, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
Vanuatu (18) 






Cash Basis Canada, Czech Republic, (Denmark), (Germany), (Hungary), 
(Ireland), Japan, Korea, (Netherlands), (Spain), (Sweden), 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, (United States) 
Accrual Basis Australia, Austria, Belgium, (Denmark), Finland, France, 
(Germany), (Hungary), Iceland, (Ireland), Italy, Luxembourg, 
(Netherlands),  New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovak 







Cash Basis Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, (Chile), Croatia, Jamaica, 
Kazakhstan,  Latvia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Panama, 
Russia, Seychelles,  Venezuela 






Cash Basis Bahrain, (Estonia),  (Malta),  Kuwait, Singapore, Slovenia,  
Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates 
Accrual Basis Cyprus, (Estonia), Israel, (Malta) 
Notes: Countries with the data collected on both cash and accrual basis are on parenthesis 
 
The criterion of this country classification is based on World Bank’s Income group 
definition and OECD membership. World Bank divides economies according to 2007 
GNI per capita calculated World Bank Atlas method. The groups are low income with 
$935 or less; lower middle income, $936-$3705; upper middle income, $3706-$11455; 
and high income, $11,456 or more. The sample includes the countries in East Asia and 
Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and 
North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and OECD members; therefore, it seems 
that there is little possibility of selection bias. Characteristics of the data used are 
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summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3 Summary Statistics 




GDP Growth Rate (%) 3.17 6.21 23.53 -30.90 
Social Spending (%) 3.50 2.31 14.22 0.002 
Population Growth Rate (%) 1.15 1.26 3.83 -5.81 
Inflation Rate (%) 152.07 1197.9 26762.02 -2.87 




GDP Growth Rate (%) 4.04 2.10 9.19 1.14 
Social Spending (%) 4.26 4.00 10.31 -12.67 
Population Growth Rate (%) 6.78 6.42 30.55 -0.92 
Inflation Rate (%) 0.81 1.06 2.89 -1.49 




GDP Growth Rate (%) 3.49 3.70 33.99 -2.39 
Social Spending (%) 6.26 4.76 23.36 0.91 
Population Growth Rate (%) 1.08 3.48 8.38 -44.40 
Inflation Rate (%) 2.30 4.17 24.47 -17.14 




GDP Growth Rate (%) 7.77 1.97 11.73 3.77 
Social Spending (%) 2.74 1.73 8.44 -0.18 
Population Growth Rate (%) 2.57 2.15 15.65 -1.77 
Inflation Rate (%) 0.60 0.47 2.20 -0.11 





GDP Growth Rate (%) 4.69 3.24 14.43 -6.85 
Social Spending (%) 3.39 2.16 7.60 0.87 
Population Growth Rate (%) 0.75 1.07 3.45 -1.50 
Inflation Rate (%) 6.68 7.68 37.08 -7.05 





GDP Growth Rate (%) 6.04 2.04 9.05 3.04 
Social Spending (%) 4.00 2.59 10.47 -0.94 
Population Growth Rate (%) 3.38 1.82 8.45 -0.30 
Inflation Rate (%) 0.89 0.89 2.64 -0.40 
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V. FINIDNGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
1. Developing Countries  
 
Results of the relationship between social spending and growth in developing 
countries, which are the cash and accrual basis combined, are shown in Table 4.  
 
 
Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between 
independent variable and error term, with m value of 11.91. This means that the 
estimated coefficients in the random effect model could be biased due to the correlations. 
Table 4 Result of Developing Country (Cash and Accrual Basis Combined) 
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth Rate 






































R-Square 0.0429 0.4339 0.0337 
Model Test 
F Value=2.62  
(<.0356) 








Number of Countries 29 29 29 
Notes: Statistically significant at * the 0.1 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Figures on 
parenthesis are standard errors. 
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In the fixed effect model, the result of F test for no fixed effect shows that the null 
hypothesis, whish is that there are no fixed effects, is rejected with 2.98 F value, 
meaning that the pooled OLS model could be also biased because of the existing fixed 
effects. As a result, the fixed effect model, which is in the second column of the table 
below, was proved to be appropriate in this regression. 
The primary finding in the results is that the estimated coefficient on social spending 
is positive and statistically significant at 0.01 significant levels. This finding provides 
evidence that social spending in developing countries can positively contribute to 
economic growth; it is not consistent with the neo-liberal economic theory. Concerning 
other variables, tax rate is negatively related to economic growth at 0.05 level. 
Table 5 reports the result of the regression in developing countries with cash basis 
data. Hausman test for random effects shows, with the 16.24 m value, that independent 
variable and error term are not uncorrelated, meaning that random effect model could be 
biased. F Test for no fixed effects reject the null hypothesis that there are no fixed 
effects, therefore, we have to choose fix effect model in estimation, which is in the 
second column of the table.  
The estimated coefficient on social spending is positive and significant at 0.01 levels. 
This positive relationship is consistent with the result of cash and accrual basis data 
combined. Tax rate also shows negative relationship in cash basis data of developing 









Regression results of developing countries data with accrual basis are displayed in 
Table 6. Null hypothesis of no random effect is rejected by Hausman test, but F value of 
the test for no fixed effect is not high enough to reject the null hypothesis.  
However, we have to consider that the number of countries in this accrual basis data 
of developing countries is just four which is very small, although panel data requires 
less units in statistical estimation than those of only cross sectional data. In all 
regressions of the other subsets in this study never show that the fixed effect model is 
inappropriate, meaning that we can hardy believe this results of F test in very small 
number of sample. Therefore, the results of this regression on accrual basis can be 
Table 5 Result of Developing Country (Cash Basis) 
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth Rate 



















































Number of Countries 25 25 25 
Notes: Statistically significant at * the 0.1 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Figures on 
parenthesis are standard errors. 
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incorrect due to the small sample, and are not meaningful. 
 
In these regressions in developing countries, we can conclude that social spending, 
overall, has positive relationship with growth in developing countries. That is, this 
finding can provide evidence that social spending is instrumental in economic growth in 
developing countries, which was partly examined in the study by Baldacci et al (2004); 
however, this result shows direct positive relationship unlike the indirect impact tested 
by Baldacci et al (2004). 
 
 
Table 6 Result of Developing Country (Accrual Basis) 
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth Rate 


















































Number of Countries 4 4 4 
Notes: Statistically significant at * the 0.1 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Figures on 
parenthesis are standard errors. 
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2. Developed Countries  
 
Regression results in developed countries, cash and accrual basis data combined, are 
presented in Table 7. The Hausman test for random effect Results test shows that there is 
correlation between independent variable and error term, with m value of 5.90, which 
means that the random effect model could be biased. The result of F test for no fixed 
effect in the second column shows that the null hypothesis is rejected with 5.34 F value, 
meaning that the existing fixed effects could make the pooled OLS biased. Therefore, 
the fixed effect model in the second column of the table below is appropriate in 
estimation. 
 
Table 7 Result of Developed Country (Cash and Accrual Basis Combined) 
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth Rate 






































R-Square 0.0494 0.4774 0.0192 
Model Test 
F Value=2.44  
(<.0481) 
F Test for No 
Fixed Effects 
F Value=5.34  
(<.0001) 
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects 
m Value=5.90  
(<.2066) 
Number of Countries 26 26 26 
Notes: Statistically significant at * the 0.1 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Figures on 
parenthesis are standard errors. 
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A statistically significant negative relationship between social spending and 
economic growth is observed in the cash basis developed countries data at 0.05 level. 
This result of negative relationship is a contrast to the results of developing countries.  
Results of the regression in the cash basis data are reported in Table 8. Hausman test 
rejects null hypothesis of uncorrelated error term, with m Value of 4.33, and F test for no 
fixed effect presents that there are fixed effects. Therefore, the regression result of fix 
effect model, which is in the second column of the table below, is favored. In the results 





Table 8 Result of Developed Country (Cash Basis) 
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth Rate 


















































Number of Countries 14 14 14 
Notes: Statistically significant at * the 0.1 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Figures on 
parenthesis are standard errors. 
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Regression result of developed countries that accrual basis data are displayed in 
Table 9. Hausman test for random effects rejects the null hypothesis that independent 
variable and error term are uncorrelated, with m value of 7.51. This shows that the 
estimation of the random effect model could be biased due to the correlations. The result 
of F test for no fixed effect presents that the null hypothesis, whish is that there are no 
fixed effects, is rejected with 7.00 F value. This means that the pooled OLS model could 
be also biased because of the fixed effects. As a result, the fixed effect model, shown in 




Table 9 Result of Developed Country (Accrual Basis) 
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth Rate 


















































Number of Countries 20 20 20 
Notes: Statistically significant at * the 0.1 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Figures on 
parenthesis are standard errors. 
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In the regression results above, social spending is negatively associated with growth 
rate at 0.01 significant level, and this negative relationship is consistent with which is 
consistent with the result of cash accrual basis combined data. Population growth rate 
also shows negative relationship with growth rate at 0.05 level, while tax rate is 
positively related to growth at 0.1 level. 
 
 
3. Semi-Developed Countries  
 
Results of relationship between spending and growth in semi-developed contries, 
which are the cash and accrual basis data combined, are presented in Table 10. Hausman 
test shows that independent variable and error term is not uncorrelated, with m value of 
6.77. Therefore, the random effect model could be biased due to the correlations. The 
result of F test for no fixed effect shows 2.14 of F value, and this value is enough to 
reject the null hypothesis that there are no fixed effects. Consequently, fixed effect 
model is found to be appropriate. 
Social spending shows statistically significant and negative relationship in the 
regression results at 0.05 level. Regarding other variables, inflation rate is negatively 










Results of the regression in the cash basis data are reported in Table 11. Hausman 
test rejects null hypothesis of no random effect with m Value of 4.84, and F test for no 
fixed effect presents that there are fixed effects. Therefore, we can choose the regression 
results of fix effect model, which is in the second column of the table below, as an 
appropriate estimation.  
Social spending in cash basis data of semi-developed countries presents insignificant 
relationship with growth rate, and this result of no relationship is different from cash and 
accrual basis combined data of developing countries which shows negative relationship. 
Inflation rate is negatively associated with growth at 0.01 level. 
Table 10 Result of Semi-Developed Country (Cash and Accrual Basis Combined) 
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth Rate 


















































Number of Countries 30 30 30 
Notes: Statistically significant at * the 0.1 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Figures on 
parenthesis are standard errors. 
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Table 11 Result of Semi-Developed Country (Cash Basis)  
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth Rate 


















































Number of Countries 23 23 23 
Notes: Statistically significant at * the 0.1 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Figures on 
parenthesis are standard errors. 
 
 
Regression results of semi-developed countries data with accrual basis are displayed 
in Table 12. Null hypothesis of no random effect is rejected by Hausman test, and F test 
for no fixed effect presents that there are fixed effects. Therefore, the result of fix effect 
model in the second column of the table below is chosen as an appropriate estimation.  
In the result of semi-developed countries with accrual basis data, there is a 
statistically significant relationship between social spending and growth rate at 0.01 
level. Regarding other variables, inflation rate is negatively related at 0.01 level, while 
tax rate shows positive coefficient at 0.05 level. 
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Table 12 Result of Semi-Developed Country (Accrual Basis) 
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth Rate 


















































Number of Countries 10 10 10 
Notes: Statistically significant at * the 0.1 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Figures on 





Gershenkron (1962) argued that different institutions were likely to be developed by 
late industrializers in order to exploit their lateness or to catch up. In other words, the 
much more active role of state can be played in the pioneer countries. Mkandawire 
(2001) suggested that among the institutions adapted by such late industrializers were 
those dealing with social policy, although it has rarely been explicitly theorized. Pierson 
(1998) notes that “late starters” have tended to develop welfare state institutions earlier 
in their own individual development and under more comprehensive terms of coverage 
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after 1923 except for the United States. That is, social policy served not only to ensure 
national cohesion, which is often asserted of Bismarck’s welfare legislation, but also to 
develop human capital that facilitated industrialization. 
Further, Developmental Welfare theory is challenging the neo-liberal views on social 
policy. The argument supporting the social policy is not defensive at all; it rather insists 
that economic growth will be impeded if the social policy is retrenched (Midgley and 
Tang, 2001). For example, Hall and Midgley (2004) insisted that important goal of 
social policy is economic development and that social policy is what the government 
should actively involve for economic development. Midgley (1995) defines social 
development as “a process of planned social change designed to promote the well-being 
of the population as a whole in conjunction with a dynamic process of economic 
development.” Midgley and Tang (2001) pointed out that social expenditures in the form 
of social investments do not detract from but contribute positively to economic 
development. 
In developing countries, there could be a situation that potential productive labor 
forces in developing countries are not able to efficiently work or do some business, 
because they have some health problems or are not well educated. In turn, productivity 
is likely to be low due to the poor use of assets and less efficiency, and economic growth, 
as a result, is becoming less competitive than they would have been otherwise (DFID, 
2006). Social spending can improve health and education condition, and offer more 
productive workforce. Social spending in developing country also can protect assets that 
help people earn an income, encourage risk taking, and promote participation in the 
labor market (DFID, 2006).  
The regression results of this study can suggest that assumption of a tradeoff 
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between efficiency and equity could be not well applied in the developing countries. 
Birdsall et al (1995) suggested that policies in East Asian countries which reduced 
poverty and income inequality, such as emphasizing high-quality basic education and 
augmenting labor demand, help stimulate economic growth in their developing period.  
Furthermore, Rodrick (1999) argues that many countries’ experiences of a growth 
collapse since the mid-1970s can be explained by domestic social conflicts. He showed 
that divided societies (as measured by indicators of inequality, ethnic fragmentation, and 
the like) and weak institutions of conflict management are the characteristics of the 
countries who experienced the sharpest drops in growth after 1975 (Rodrick, 1999). 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) also suggested that there is a significant and large negative 






This study examined the relationship between social spending and economic growth, 
drawing a comparison between the result of developing countries and that of developed 
(or OECD member) and semi-developed countries.  
We found that estimated coefficient on social spending is positive and statistically 
significant in the sample of developing countries. This result is a contrast with neo-
liberal economic theory. On the other hand, a significant negative relationship between 
social spending and economic growth is observed in the sample of developed countries. 
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Lastly, the results of the regression in the sample of semi-developed countries show that 
there is statistically significant and negative relationship, although there is also 
insignificant negative coefficient in one regression of cash basis data.  
This finding can imply that that assumption of a tradeoff between efficiency and 
equity could be not well applied in the developing countries. Therefore, we have to 
consider not only what to do but also where to do, when we discuss the social spending 
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사회지출과 경제 성장의 관계에 관한 실증연구 
-개발도상국과 OECD국가 비교- 
 
사회지출과 경제성장과의 관계에 관한 실증적인 연구는 그동안 OECD국가들을 
대상으로 한 것이 대부분이었다. 즉, 사회지출이 경제성장에 미치는 영향에 대해서 
개발도상국을 대상으로 한 연구나, 개발도상국과 OECD국가를 비교한 연구는 거의 
없었다. 그러나 개발도상국은 사회적, 경제적, 그리고 제도적 환경에 있어 OECD국
가와는 매우 다르며, 이것은 같은 내용의 정책이나 공공지출일지라도 전혀 다른 결
과를 가져올 가능성이 많다는 것을 의미한다.  
 
따라서 본 연구는 선진국, 중진국, 개발도상국으로 나누어 각각의 국가군에서 
사회지출과 경제성장과의 관계를 통계적으로 검증하는 시도를 하였다. IMF의 
Government Finance Statistics의 1990년부터 2007년까지 85개국의 패널 데이터를 
활용하였고, error component 모형으로 time series cross section 회귀 분석을 하
였다.  
 
그 결과 개발도상국 표본에서는 사회지출과 경제성장이 양의 상관관계를 갖는 
것으로 나온 반면, 선진국에서는 음의 상관관계는 갖는 것으로 나왔다. 본 연구의 이
러한 결과는 효율성과 평등이 동시에 충족될 수 없다는 신자유주의적 이론이 개발도
상국에서는 잘 적용되지 않을 수 있다는 것을 의미한다. 그러므로 개발도상국의 사
회정책이나 개발 프로그램을 실행함에 있어 "무엇"을 할지와 더불어 "어디"에 "언제"
할 것인지 고려하는 것이 함께 필요하다는 함의를 이 연구를 통해 얻을 수 있다고 
할 수 있다. 
 
 
